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The Defendants'
Brief in the School
Finance Case:
McDuffy v. Robertson:

An Excerpt and
a Summary
by Douglas H. Wilkins, Robert H.
Blumenthal and Mary C. Connaughton'

Douglas H. Wilkins and Mary C. Connaughton are Assistant Attorneys General of Massachusetts. Mr. Wilkins is
Chief of Litigation and Training in the
Government Bureau of the Massachusetts
Attorney General's Office. Robert Bluinenthal is Counsel to the Massachusetts
Board and Department of Education. All
three are attorneys for the state defendants in the McDuffy litigation.
[Note: The introduction and part I of this
article are excerpts from the brief of the
defendants in the McDuffy case. Part II
of the article is a sunmnary of the remainder of the brief.]

Introduction
The wisdom of promoting public education in the Commonwealth was
recognized by the earliest settlers, the
framers of the Constitution, and many
subsequent legislatures, officials, educators and citizens. The opinions of
the Department, the Secretary of Edu-
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cation, the Governor and various educators, contained in the stipulation,
demonstrate that a policy of supporting public education is as important
today as ever.'
The implementation of this policy
goal by the Legislature and municipalities involves choices that are at the
heart of representative government:
how much public money to raise, how
best to allocate the money among education and the many other public purposes that compete for public funds,
and how to strike the balance between
state and local control of the schools,
so as to promote education. The decisions made through these processes
have resulted in some success in raising educational expenditures over the
past decade and providing a significant degree of equalization, but they
have also resulted in relative shortcomings in some districts, which are
detailed in the parties' stipulation. The
question for the Court is what status
our Constitution affords these decisions, made through democratic
processes.
Ordinarily, "laillocation of taxpayer
dollars, especially in times of limited
fiscal resources, is the quintessential responsibility of the popularly-elected
Legislature, not the Courts." See
County of Barnstable v.Conmnonwealth,
410 Mass. 326,329 (1991). The plaintiffs
argue, however, that Pt. II, c. 5, §2 of
the Massachusetts Constitution (The
Education Clause) requires the Commonwealth to provide an "adequate"
education. While apparently accepting
the notion that some school districts
may lawfully choose to spend more
per pupil than others, the plaintiffs
urge the Court to invalidate the existing legislative scheme on the ground
that education in their public schools
does not meet an undefined standard
of "adequacy." The Commonwealth's
Constitution does not, however, wrest
control over questions of educational
adequacy, school finance and equitable
distribution of funds from the legislative bodies of the state and the municipalities. As in many areas of vital
importance to the well-being of the
Commonwealth's citizens, decisions
regarding educational finance are committed to the democratic processes.

I. The Education Clause Does not
Inval1 ,ite the Commonwealth's
System of Education or Education
Finance.
The Education Clause appears in Part
II of the Massachusetts Constitution,
which concerns the "frame of government." It reads:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well
as virtue, diffused generally
among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation
of their rights and liberties; and as
these depend on spreading the
opportunities and advantages of
education in the various parts of
the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall
be the duty of the legislatures, and
magistrates, in all future periods
of this commonwealth, to cherish
the interests of li. ,-1ireand the sciences, and all seminaries of them;
especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar
schools in the towns; to encourage
private societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities
for the promotion of agriculture,
arts, sciences, commerce, trades,
manufactures, and a natural history of the country, to countenance and inculcate the principles
of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity,
industry and frugality, honesty
and punctuality in their dealings;
sincerity, good humor, and all social affections, and generous sentiments among the people.
Mass. Const. Pt. II, c. V, §2 (emphasis
added).
The Clause urges legislators to hold
education in high regard as they consider and enact or reject proposed legislation. The operative word as to
literature and sciences, however, is
"cherish." By its plain meaning in 1780
(and now), the word does not prohibit
or require any class of legislation; it
simply means "to hold dear... to
make much of; ... to foster, tend, cultivate; ... to entertain in the mind, harbor fondly, encourage .... " Oxford
English Dictionary (2d Ed. 1989), p. 88
(definitions 1, 2b, 7). John Adams, who
drafted the Education Clause, used
"cherish" in this sense.'
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The Education Clause is aspirational:
The section, couched in broad inspirational terms, is an exhortation from the founding fathers to
their successors. It sets out the
goals of the social order and suggests the means by which they
might best be attained. So far as
we are aware, however, the section
has never been cited as a constitutional command forbidding or requiring specific legislative action.
McNeely v. Board of Appeal of Boston,
358 Mass. 94, 104 (1970) (emphasis
added). The Clause's language-particularly the operative verb, "cherish"--does not refer to or imply a right
to an adequate or equal education beyond what the Legislature or municipality provides. Indeed, if such a right
existed, it would undoubtedly have
been placed where the framers enumerated the rights that were to be protected against majority rule: in Part I of
the Constitution, the Declaration of
Rights.
The general content of the Education Clause further demonstrates that
it cannot be a limitation upon legislative authority. The legislature's "duty"
extends not only to "cherish ... literature and the sciences," but also to
"encourage" private and public efforts
in promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, etc. and "to countenance and
inculcate the principles of humanity
and general benevolence," etc. In this
section, "the interests of literature and
the sciences" are grouped with a
number of other goals, such as "general benevolence," "sincerity, good
humor, and all social affections, and
generous sentiments among the people," that cannot be measured or evaluated
under
any judicially
manageable standard. The objects of
the "duty" include not only the "public schools and grammar schools in the
towns," but also Harvard University
and private societies. In other words, it
is one of a number of provisions containing aspirational language authorizing legislative action, which appear
throughout the Constitution.4
The Education Clause does not articulate any requirement that local
schools meet some constitutional standard of "adequacy." Even today, the
notion of adequacy commands no conBOSTON BAR JOURNAL

sensus among educational experts
(Supp. Stip. 542). Nor does the
Clause intimate that education in different districts must be equal or substantially equivalent. Like some other
constitutional education clauses in
northeastern states, our Education
Clause does not suggest that "districts
choosing to provide opportunities beyond those that other districts might
elect or be able to offer be foreclosed
from doing so, or that local control of
education, to the extent that a more extensive program were locally desired
and provided, be abolished." See Board
of Education, Levittown Union Free
School District v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27;
453 N.Y.S. 2d, 643; 439 N.E.2d 359, 368
(1982), appeal dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 1139
(1983).
The Constitution is "an enduring instrument," and its words are intentionally general, so as to permit the people
to govern themselves "through radical
changes in social, economic and industrial conditions." Cohen v. Attorney
General, 357 Mass. 564, 570-572 (1970).
To reflect that need for flexibility, the
framers of the Education Clause chose
broad aspirational language instead of
words of limitation or obligation. The
language of the Constitution is controlling. See generally, id., 357 Mass. at 572;
Lincoln v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 326 Mass. 313 (1950).
I. Summary of Remaining Portions
of the Brief
The history of the Clause supports this
reading. From the colonial days to the
present, Massachusetts has depended
upon strong local control over the
provision and financing of public education. Cushing v. Inhabitants of Newburyport, 51 Mass. 508, 515-519 (1845).
See also Jenkins v. Inhabitants of Andover, 103 Mass. 94, 97-99 (1869). The
state has had a secondary role in such
matters. Differences in spending
among the towns have been viewed as
promoting education, in conformity
with the goals of the Education Clause.
John Adams, who drafted the Constitution, believed that support for education would have to come from the
people,' and did not intend to establish
a Constitutional right to an adequate
or equal education.

Even if the Education Clause contains mandatory content, the Commonwealth has complied with it. The
legislature has weighed the need for
local control, state funding for specific
educational programs, general state
education aid to communities, and fiscal concerns. The legislature's passage
of numerous laws, the substantial increase in spending per pupil over the
past decade, the significant equalizing
effect of state education aid distribution, and the recent increases in aid
earmarked for education all demonstrate that the legislature has "cherished" education, within the meaning
of the Education Clause. In addition,
the state has required local municipalities to provide for education. The
resulting system is evolving, and reflects a balance between these goals
that the legislature could rationally
accept. This is particularly true, in
light of the uncertainties and policy
judgments that attend any effort to define or achieve educational adequacy
or equality.
Finally, the record shows that the
plaintiffs' districts provide fewer educational opportunities than in a number of wealthier districts, but does not
establish educational "inadequacy" in
any of plaintiffs' schools as a constitutional matter. There is no accepted
standard by which to measure adequacy and no agreement on how
much money would be necessary to
provide an adequate education. The
levels spent on education per pupil are
high in Massachusetts, by historic
standards and compared to levels in
other states. The opinions of experts in
the record regarding the inadequacy of
education in plaintiffs' districts are not
tied to any articulable standard and do
not, in themselves, set the constitutional minima.
If out-of-state decisions are to be
considered, the most analogous and
persuasive opinions are from the 16 jurisdictions that have upheld education
finance systems., These jurisdictions
include states with constitutional education clauses that are similar to, or
stronger than Massachusetts' Education Clause. E.g. Nyquist, supra. In the
10 jurisdictions that have invalidated
educational finance systems, the constitutional provisions and the facts
MARCH/APRIL 1993
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tend to differ greatly from those in
Massachusetts. Moreover, the aftermath of education finance decisions in
many of those 10 jurisdictions gives
cause for concern.
The plaintiffs' equal protection challenge must be evaluated under the
rational basis test. For equal protection
purposes in a school finance challenge
of this nature, there is no fundamental
right of access to an "adequate education" of undefined quality, at least
where the plaintiffs are receiving a
public education. See San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). There is also no suspect class,
as distinctions based upon residence
are not "suspect" for purposes of
equal protection strict scrutiny. Barlow
v. Wareham, 410 Mass. 408 (1988).
Under the equal protection rational
basis test, the preservation of local control over education is ample justification for the Commonwealth's
education system. See Opinion of the
Justices, 386 Mass. 1201 (1982). Indeed,
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the Massachusetts Home Rule Amendment (Mass. Const. Art. Am. 2) declares the fundamental interest of the
people in local self-government as a
means of ensuring customary and traditional liberties. Local control allows
citizens to participate in decisionmaking, allows localities to tailor their
education programs to local needs and
permits experimentation and innovation. The plaintiffs' proposed remedies
would cut deeply into local control.
While their approach may have merit,
it is a legislative choice whether or not
to reduce local control and increase
state regulation and monitoring of the
education system.
NOTES
I The views expressed in this Article are entirely those advanced in the brief of the defendants in McDuffy v. Robertson, SJC No. 6128 and
do not necessarily reflect the personal views of
the Attorney General of Massachusetts or the
named defendants.
2. The opinions of the Attorney General regarding educational policy (but not the merits of
the McDuffy case) are set forth in "The Case for
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Education Reform: Our Debt to the Next Generation" by Scott Harshbarger, ante at page 5.
3. See J.Adams, "A Dissertation on the Canon
and the Feudal Law," No. 4 (October 21, 1765),
reprinted in I Papers of John Adams (R. Taylor
ed. 1977), p. 126 ("Let us tenderly and kindly
cherish, therefore the means of knowledge.").
4. See e.g. Pt. I,Art. 1 (people's right "of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness");
Pt. I, Art. VII ("Government is instituted for the
common good" and only the people have a
right to change it); Pt. I, Art. XVIII ("The people
ought ... to have a particular attention to" piety,
justice, moderation, temperance, industry and
frugality "in the choice of their lawgivers and
representatives"); Pt. II, Art. IV (Legislature's
power to make such laws, not repugnant to the
Constitution "as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of this commonwealth"); Art.
Am. 88 (industrial development is a public purpose); Art. Am. 97 (protection of the people's
right to conservation, development and utilization of natural resources is "a public purpose.");
LIMITS v. President of the Senate, 414 Mass. 31, 35
(1992) (legislature's duty to take final action
under Am. Art. 48 is not judicially enforceable).
5. See VI Works of John Adams, pp. 198, 416
(C.F. Adams, ed. 1851).
6. See generally, Dively and G.A. Hickrod,
"Update of Selected States' Equity Funding Litigation and the 'Box Score'," 17 J. Ed. Fin. 352,
362-363 (Spring 1992).
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